Antitrust, Innovation, and Uncertain Property Rights: Some Practical Considerations by Williamson, Dean V.
Antitrust, Innovation, and Uncertain Property Rights:  





The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property circumscribes two 
century-long debates.  The first pertains to questions about how antitrust 
law and intellectual property law interact, and the second pertains to 
questions about how parties can exploit property rights, including 
intellectual property rights, to exclude competitors.  This iBrief finesses 
these questions and turns to practical considerations about how 
innovation and intellectual property can impinge antitrust enforcement.  
This iBrief develops two propositions.  First, although collaborative 
research and development has often been and remains unwittingly 
misunderstood, what is understood about it is consistent with the long-
standing observation that antitrust has rarely interfered with 
collaborative ventures.  Second, shifting focus from “intellectual 
property rights” to “uncertain property rights” makes it easier to 
understand what innovation and intellectual property imply for 
enforcement processes.  Both intellectual property and tangible assets 
imply the same processes, but the boundaries of intellectual properties 
may be uncertain and may, in turn, allow parties to game enforcement 
processes in ways that would not be feasible in antitrust matters that 
principally feature tangible assets.  Even so, uncertain property rights 
might not frustrate enforcement processes as the antitrust authorities 
may yet be able to factor parties’ strategic behaviors into the design of 
antitrust remedies. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he exigencies of war have thrust into the foreground the whole 
topic of the function of patents in our economy. Under the pressure 
placed on our economic system, it has become apparent that the 
misuse of patents is one of the most serious and difficult problems in 
the field of national economic policy.”2
 
  
                                                     
1 Research Economist, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice.  Email: 
dean.williamson@usdoj.gov.  The views expressed in this paper are my own and 
do not necessarily reflect official policy of the United States Department of 
Justice. 
2 Joseph Borkin, Patent Abuses, Compulsion to License and Recent Decisions, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 720 (1943) [hereinafter Borkin, Patent Abuses]. 
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¶1.  With some adaptation, one might be tempted to believe that this 
statement characterizes the status of study and debate today, but this was 
Joseph Borkin, chief of the Patent and Cartel Section of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice in 1943.3  At that time many 
observers perceived a “patent problem”—indeed, “the patent problem”—
that stemmed from “[t]he power to exclude others from access to 
technology.”4  Borkin observed, however, that the power to exclude per 
se had not been “regarded as subject to attack under the antitrust laws.”5  
Instead, antitrust law could be brought to bear on the patent problem 
through indirect means.  Intellectual property law had developed a patent 
misuse exception to “the power to exclude.”6  Upon being drawn into a 
patent infringement suit, defendant entities could appeal to a misuse 
defense, whereby a finding of misuse would allow the antitrust 
authorities to march in and impose licensing or other remedies.7
¶2. Borkin’s observations constitute epilogue to an early effort 
within government to investigate three pairwise interactions: interactions 
between (1) antitrust law and intellectual property law, (2) antitrust and 
innovation, and (3) intellectual property and innovation.  In 1938 the 
Roosevelt Administration exhorted Congress to assemble the Temporary 
National Economic Committee.
 
8  The Committee was charged with 
studying, among other things, “the effect of existing tax, patent, and 
other Government policies upon competition, price levels, 
unemployment, profits, and consumption.”9  Once the Committee was in 
place, the administration interjected the Antitrust Division in a 
“systematic attack” on “the problems presented by the abuse of patent 
privileges.”10
¶3. One can guess that much has changed since 1938.  The Patent 
and Cartel Section has long been dissolved; from the 1940’s to the 
1960’s, systematic attack gave way to glacial extension in the case law of 
the misuse defense to a range of licensing practices;
 
11
                                                     
3 See id.  
 extension induced 
confusion about the relationship between misuse defenses and antitrust 
4 Id. at 720–21. 
5 Id. at 721. 
6 See id. at 720–21.  
7 Borkin observed that the Antitrust Division had been doing just that: 
intervening in private patent litigation. See id. at 721.  
8 Joseph Borkin, Patents and the New Trust Problem, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 74, 78 (1940) [hereinafter Borkin, The New Trust Problem].   
9 Id. (quoting S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong., 52 Stat. 705 (1938) §2(a)(3)).   
10 Id. 
11 Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform 
Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust 
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 177 (1989); Note, Is the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine Obsolete, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1924 (1997). 
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defenses;12 all along the way commentators debated the prospect of 
supplanting the misuse defense with an outright antitrust defense;13 and 
extension gave way to glacial retreat.14
¶4. More striking is what has not changed.  The statutory basis for 
antitrust enforcement may go back as far as the Sherman Act of 1890, 
but vigorous debate persists over how antitrust law and intellectual 
property law should intersect.
 
15  It gets worse.  More than seventy years 
have passed, yet economists and policymakers remain unequipped to 
characterize how innovation policies and patent regimes affect 
innovation.16
¶5. In this iBrief I offer—with more than a little humility—a few 
observations about two of the three sets of pairwise interactions.  In the 
first part of the paper, I offer insight into how commentators have 
perceived interactions between antitrust and innovation.  Some of the 
policy action has turned on the perception that (1) much innovation may 
derive from collaborative research and development (R&D), (2) 
collaboration between competing entities may yield much of that 
innovation,
  That leaves them unequipped to design patent systems and 
innovation policies. 
17
                                                     
12 Bartholomew Diggins, The Patent Anti-Trust Problem, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1093 
(1955); Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete, supra note 11, at 
 and yet (3) antitrust enforcement may frustrate 
1924. 
13 Diggins, supra note 12, at 1114–15; Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete, 
supra note 11, at 1931–36. 
14 Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete, supra note 11, at 1928–31. 
15 Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints On Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 
247–48 (2007); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At The 
Periphery of Intellectual Property (Stanford Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper 
No. 275; Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 04-02-03, 2004); Daniel 
J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled Relations With Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1695 (2003); R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property 
Rights, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 429, 429–31 (2002). 
16 See, e.g., Kenneth Flamm & Sadao Nagaoka, The Chrysanthemum Meets the 
Eagle: Japanese and U.S. Innovation Policies Have Been Evolving Since the 
19th Century, 24 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 70 (2007); Rudolph Peritz, Rethinking 
U.S. Antitrust & Intellectual Property Rights (N.Y. Law Sch. Pub. Law and 
Legal Theory, Research Paper Series 04/50 #22, 2005); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., 
Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition, 4 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 115 (2004); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust 
Law Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984). 
17 A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, 
Formalism & The Intersection of Antitrust & Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 407 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: 
Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 913, 913–924 (2001) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Challenges of the New 
Economy]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST 
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collaboration.18  While researchers have much to learn about how parties 
organize collaborative R&D, there is empirical research consistent with 
the hypothesis that most collaboration has involved parties contributing 
complementary know-how and capabilities.19  Many of those parties may 
not even have been direct competitors in any cognizable antitrust market.  
Even so, complementarity alone would not get parties off of the antitrust 
hook.  As Sakakibara observes, it contrasts with theoretical research 
which was motivated by policy questions relating to collaboration 
between competing entities that contribute fungible inputs.20
                                                                                                                       
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), 
  The 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; Donald F. Turner, Basic 
Principles in Framing Antitrust and Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1985); Senate Report on 
The National Cooperation Research Act of 1984, S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3106 [hereinafter Senate Report]; Joseph Borkin, 
THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN (1978) [hereinafter Borkin, 
Farben]. 
18 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation and Competition: 
Implications for Antitrust, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (1990). 
19 See, e.g., Joanne E. Oxley & Rachelle C. Sampson, The Scope and 
Governance of International R&D Alliances, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 723 
(2004); Rachelle C. Sampson, Organizational Choice in R&D Alliances: 
Knowledge-Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives, 25 MANAGERIAL 
DECISION ECON. 421 (2004); Suzanne E. Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, 
Incomplete Contracting and the Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in 
15 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 201 
(Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004) [hereinafter Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete 
Contracting];  Suzanne E. Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Endogenous 
Spillovers, Strategic Blocking, and the Design of Contracts in Collaborative 
R&D: Evidence from NCRA filings of R&D Joint Ventures (Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Econ. Analysis Group, Working Paper 02-1, 2002); Mariko 
Sakakibara, Knowledge Sharing in Cooperative Research and Development, 24 
MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 117 (2003) [hereinafter Sakakibara, Knowledge 
Sharing]; Mariko Sakakibara, Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and 
Cooperative Research and Development: An Empirical Examination of Motives, 
18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 143 (1997) [hereinafter Sakakibara, Heterogenity]; Lee 
Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, Japanese Research Consortia: A 
Microeconometric Analysis of Industrial Policy, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 207 (1998) 
[hereinafter Branstetter & Sakakibara, Microeconometric Analysis]; Peter 
Grindley et al., SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design 
of High-Technology Consortia, 13 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 723 (1994). 
20 Seminal contributions include Morton I. Kamien et al., Research Joint 
Ventures and R&D Cartels, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1293 (1992); Claude 
d’Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in 
Duopoly with Spillovers, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1133 (1988); Michael L. Katz, An 
Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 17 RAND J. ECON. 527 
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suggestion is that it might not be too surprising that the antitrust 
authorities have rarely challenged such arrangements as R&D joint 
ventures.21
¶6. In the second part of this iBrief I make a few observations about 
“the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property.”  It is a curious 
phrase in that one might not immediately discern how it is different from 
“the intersection of antitrust and property.”  Much of the action turns on 
tricky doctrinal questions about how two bodies of law (antitrust law and 
intellectual property law) interact.
 
22
                                                                                                                       
(1986); Michael Spence, Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry 
Performance, 52 ECONOMETRICA 101 (1984).   
  Yet, I explore doctrinal questions 
and turn to practical considerations about how intellectual property can 
impinge antitrust enforcement.  That is, once presented with an antitrust 
inquiry—a merger analysis or inquiry into vertical contracting practices, 
say—can it make sense to treat intellectual property differently from 
other types of property? 
This literature assumes that firms are symmetrical in terms of their 
capabilities or knowledge, which implies that the cooperating firms 
belong to a single industry.  Firms seek to achieve a single R&D 
outcome, and it is implicitly assumed that there is only one efficient 
way to pursue this outcome.  Participating firm, therefore, benefit 
from this efficient, non-duplicative approach.  It is also implicitly 
assumed that firm knowledge and technologies are close substitutes.  
A basis for these assumptions is the desire to obtain interesting 
equilibrium outcomes from the game-theoretic models.  A result, 
however, is that this literature only address a limited of cooperative 
activity.  In contrast, in the managerial literature, firms in alliances 
are often recognized to possess heterogeneous capabilities, and they 
may or may not be direct competitors in the product market.   
Mariko Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia and Firm Behavior: 
Evidence from Japanese Data, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 181, 183 (2001) [hereinafter 
Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia]. 
21 Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17, at 414; Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust 
and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 544 (2001) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Beyond 
Microsoft]; S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105. 
22 See, e.g., Michel J. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property after 
Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2006) [hereinafter Carrier, Refusals to 
License]; Michael J. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 761 (2002); Kieff & Paredes, supra note 15; Gifford, supra note 15; 
Melamed  & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17; Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990); Turner, 
supra note 17; Borkin, The New Trust Problem, supra note 8; Kaplow, supra 
note 16 (contending that some of the questions are tricky, because it can be hard 
to bring economic analysis to bear). 
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¶7. As a matter of antitrust law, the immediate answer is “no.”  To 
the extent we can understand both rights over intangible assets and rights 
over physical assets as rights to exclude, then, “[e]xcept in the rarest 
case, we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the 
law . . . .”23  Consider, for example, bottleneck assets—assets to which a 
party must secure license or physical access in order to commercialize a 
good or service.24
¶8. As a matter of antitrust process, the intermediate answer is “yes,” 
because intellectual property may allow parties to manipulate 
enforcement processes or frustrate remedies to antitrust problems in 
ways that would not be feasible in transactions that principally feature 
tangible assets.  To illustrate this, first consider that delineating 
intellectual properties may constitute a nontrivial problem.  A line in the 
sand might go far toward delineating the bounds of beachfront 
properties, and delineating properties may allow enforcement authorities 
to identify bottleneck assets, but property rights may be uncertain in that 
neither the enforcement authorities nor parties themselves may be able to 
distinguish fine lines between intellectual properties.  One problem is 
that enforcement authorities might find themselves having to decide 
whether some bundle of intellectual properties constitutes a bottleneck.  
For example, parties to a merger might argue that at least one of them 
already maintains a bottleneck, thus inviting the antitrust authorities to 
conclude that the merger does not create a bottleneck that had not already 
existed.  A determination that a merger does not create a new bottleneck 
would dismiss an important justification for blocking the merger, but 
effectively evaluating the parties’ claim might be problematic.  It might 
even prove impossible.  Alternatively, parties might argue that none of 
them maintains a bottleneck and that the consolidation of their 
intellectual properties under unified control does not create a new 
bottleneck.  Again, the antitrust authorities find themselves having to 
evaluate a difficult, possibly insoluble, claim. 
  The antitrust authorities would have obvious interest 
in a transaction that would allow an entity or collection of entities to 
secure a bottleneck where no bottleneck had existed before.  Once having 
established that a bundle of assets constitutes a bottleneck, distinctions 
between physical assets or intangible assets add nothing that one could 
not already discern about the ability of the parties controlling the 
bottleneck to act as a gatekeeper and exclude rivals. 
                                                     
23 Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 118.   
24 The bottleneck might comprise a telecommunications network.  Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  A 
bottleneck may also comprise a bundle of patents.  See United States v. 3D Sys. 
Corp., No. 1:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL 964343 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001).  For 
more on 3D Systems and DTM, see infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
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¶9. Most of the above discussion here revolves around patents.  That 
is natural, and, indeed, most discussions in this area revolve around 
patents.  Patents are observable.  They are enumerated and formally 
documented, but that leaves out other instruments such as trade secrets 
that parties use to protect their investments in R&D.25  That, in turn, 
leaves out important questions about parties’ decisions to patent, to not 
patent, to exploit other mechanisms, or to forgo investments in R&D.26
¶10. Finally, this overall discussion does not make more than passing 
contact with “know-how,” including “tacit knowledge.”  Tacit 
knowledge is interesting because it is the uncodifiable information in the 
heads of engineers over which it is impossible for a firm to assign 
property rights.  Indeed, it is the kind of stuff that parties might be able to 
transfer only by personnel transfers.  Non-compete provisions in 
engineers’ employment contracts and no-poaching provisions in R&D 
joint venture contracts may provide clues about when the real value in a 
technology is tied up in know-how and tacit knowledge. 
 
 
                                                     
25 As a matter of course, trade secrets are not intended to be observable, and yet 
in some industries trade secrets constitute important means of exploiting 
investments in technologies.  Consider, for example, the importance of trade 
secrets to Wal-Mart Stores.  Wal-Mart has made it to the top of Fortune 500 by 
efficiently distributing merchandise.  Its growth has depended on development 
of its proprietary merchandising system, and it has endeavored to maintain 
secrecy over the design of the system.  Secrets, of course, are susceptible to 
expropriation by various means including personnel transfers.  In 1998 Wal-
Mart accused Amazon.com of selectively poaching employees in order to learn 
about Wal-Mart’s information systems.  The parties settled litigation in 1999 
with Amazon agreeing to reassign former Wal-Mart employees to less sensitive 
positions within Amazon.  See Wal-Mart Agrees to Settle Lawsuit Against 
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1999, at C6.  
26 See, e.g., Bharat Anand & Alexander Galetovic, Strategies That Work When 
Property Rights Don’t, in ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 19, at 261; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie H. 
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the 
U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001); 
Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.; Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, 
Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-licensing in 
Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1997); Richard C. 
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 18 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACT. 783 (1987). 
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I. ANTITRUST & COLLABORATIVE R&D 
¶11. Interactions between antitrust and innovation have made it to the 
top of policymakers’ agendas during at least two acute episodes of 
national angst.  From 1933 and into 1937, the economy had climbed 
steadily from the nadir of depression, but by the summer of 1937 it had 
commenced another round of sharp contraction.27  The Administration 
had to give the appearance of doing something—hence the Temporary 
National Economic Committee of 1938.28  Coming into the 1980’s, 
severe economic contraction was again an important feature of the policy 
environment, but this time it was matched with concerns that Japanese 
industry would assume preeminence in the development and production 
of semiconductors.29  The government launched a number of initiatives, 
including the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984.30  
The government also took a hand in motivating and subsidizing a 
number of research consortia, the most prominent being the 
SEMATECH consortium.31  The NCRA was designed to promote intra-
industry collaboration in R&D by relieving R&D joint ventures of some 
of the hazards that private antitrust actions could impose.32  In 1993 the 
government enacted the National Cooperative Research and Production 
Act (NCRPA), thus extending the protections afforded under NCRA to 
production joint ventures.33  SEMATECH (“Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Technology”) was, as the name suggests, designed to 
promote collaboration between competitors in the development of 
semiconductor manufacturing technologies.34
¶12. Drawing from that history, antitrust outsiders, and sometimes 
insiders, have made at least three kinds of claims.  The first pertains to 
R&D intensity.
 
35  In both episodes, policymakers internalized a kind of 
“Schumpeterian” notion that larger agglomerations of firms or larger 
firms themselves would be better equipped to concentrate the resources 
sufficient to pursue ambitious R&D.  It then becomes tempting to 
suggest that the antitrust authorities should count improved capacity to 
conduct R&D as an “efficiency” justification for collaboration between 
firms.  The second claim pertains to the efficiency of R&D.36
                                                     
27 See Ben S. Bernake, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 261 (1983). 
  Some 
28 The committee was created by S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong., 52 Stat. 705 (1938). 
29 See Flamm & Nagaoka, supra note 16, at 72. 
30 Id.; Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984). 
31 See generally Grindley et al., supra note 19. 
32 See generally S. REP. NO. 98-427 (1984).   
33 Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993). 
34 See Grindley et al., supra note 19. 
35 See infra Part I.A. 
36 See infra Part I.B. 
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observers have suggested that collaboration itself, including 
collaboration between competing entities, would enable parties to 
conduct R&D more effectively—that is, collaborators should yield more 
innovation for each dollar they collectively invest in R&D.  “Cost-
sharing”, for example, could promote efficiency by allowing firms to 
avoid duplication of costly R&D.  Similarly, collaboration might allow 
parties to join complementary know-how and capabilities and exploit 
“two-heads-are-better-than-one” economies.  Either way, the claim 
amounts to another efficiency justification for collaboration.  Finally, 
some observers complained that antitrust analysis is poorly equipped to 
characterize competition in “dynamic,” “fast-paced,” “high-tech” 
industries.37  They suggest that the antitrust authorities end up basing 
analyses on static snap-shots of prevailing market conditions when those 
authorities should do what firms do: attempt to look forward and factor 
into their analyses anticipated changes in market conditions.38
 
  Changes 
might even include the emergence of new markets—markets that would 
not come to exist but for innovation and collaboration.  I make a few 
observations about each of these points in turn. 
A. Collaboration and R&D Intensity 
¶13. The initiatives of the late 1930’s and those of the 1980’s and 
1990’s appear similar in at least one respect: in both instances 
policymakers maintained a notion that collaborating firms would be 
better equipped to mobilize and focus substantial resources on ambitious 
R&D.39  In the first instance, the authorities ascribed to cartels the ability 
to collectively concentrate resources.40
                                                     
37 See infra Part I.C.; Pate, supra note 15; Pitofsky, Challenges of the New 
Economy, supra note 17; Pitofsky, Beyond Microsoft, supra note 21; Jorde & 
Teece, supra note 18. 
  Even so, they actively chose to 
38 See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic 
Efficiency concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571 (1994). 
39 Why individual firms could not, or would not access sufficient resources from 
external sources remains a question.  In this age of venture capital and private 
equity, perhaps they do. 
40 Joseph Borkin appears again in a pivotal role.  In the preface to The Crime 
and Punishment of I.G. Farben, Borkin observes that in the early 1930’s he and 
others in government became aware of the “cartelization” of munitions-related 
industries.  One target of the “[anti-]cartel program” launched at the Antitrust 
Division was the German conglomerate I.G. Farben.  The Division understood 
that I.G. Farben had aggressively exercised and policed its patent rights by 
entangling global competitors in a web of cross-licenses and patent pools.  The 
various R&D projects I.G. Farben pursued included the liquefication of coal into 
fuel oil.  The understanding is that the individual I.G. Farben companies could 
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ignore this intuition and instead focused on diminishing the influence of 
those same cartels.41  In the latter instance, the designers of the NCRA 
and other programs ascribed to industry consortia the ability to 
concentrate resources.42
¶14. That notion has some of the flavor of one part of the 
“Schumpeterian hypothesis” by which greater “firm size” (if not 
consortium size or cartel size) should enable firms to invest more 
aggressively in R&D.
  They then proceeded to suggest that the 
antitrust authorities should not dismiss collaboration between 
competitors out of hand. 
43
                                                                                                                       
not have pursued the project independently but rather had to merge in order to 
concentrate sufficient financial resources under unified control.  Borkin, Farben, 
supra note 17, at 54. 
  Larger agglomerations might, for example, be 
41 Borkin described the cartel problem as follows:  
The formidable arrays of patents collected by industrial combinations for the 
purpose of dividing fields into non-competitive spheres, establishing quota 
systems of manufacture, controlling the price and use of non-patented articles 
and services, ‘blocking off’ developments and ‘fencing in’ licensees and 
competitors, can scarcely be considered an incentive to genius or a promotion 
of ‘science and useful arts.’  Instead patents have to some extent become 
instruments of oppression, representing economic waste through the non-
utilization or restricted utilization of the resources of knowledge they embody, 
rather than eliminating waste by spurring increased efficiency. 
Borkin, The New Trust Problem, supra note 8, at 78.  
42 The Senate Report indicates a role for pooling resources.  The Report 
indicated that  
[a]nother and more serious problem is that much important research may never 
be done if firms are not able or willing to undertake such research on their own.  
Mr. Charles H. Herz, General Counsel of the National Science Foundation, 
addressed the problem of foregone collaborative research before the [Senate 
Judiciary] Committee: (I)n an era of accelerating technology, development, 
increasingly complex and costly R&D, and heightened international 
competition, the United States and specific U.S. industries need to be 
concerned about research and development that a typical corporation cannot 
take on alone. 
S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 2 (1984).  Peter McClosky, president of the Electronics 
Industries Association, continued: “By pooling resources, companies can afford 
longer-term research—the fruits of which will be employed to assure our 
industrial competitiveness worldwide.” Id.   
43 Katz and Shelanski efficiently encapsulate the “Schumpeterian hypothesis”:  
[Joseph] Schumpeter's argument that most technological innovation would 
come from large corporations with market power and organized R&D 
operations implied that the ideal of competition under antitrust law could have 
substantial social costs over time. . . .  Although Schumpeter wrote [in 1942] 
mostly about large firms, their associated economies of scale for R&D, and 
their ability to attract capital and talented scientists, his critique of perfect 
competition and discussion of the benefits of market power suggest that his 
ideal innovators were not only large but dominant as well.  
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better equipped to attract external sources of capital or to mobilize 
internal sources for ambitious R&D.  Even so, both the hypothesis and 
the generalized notion to which policymakers subscribed are 
problematic.  Empirical research has demonstrated some correlation 
between firm size and R&D expenditures.  A difficulty is that correlation 
does not imply causation, and, indeed, researchers still puzzle over the 
“structural” relationship between the two.44  It is not obvious that an 
important causal relationship exists.45
 
  Yet, even if the concentration of 
resources within a firm, consortium, or cartel does translate into more 
intensive R&D, more intensive R&D itself does not count as an 
“efficiency” justification for agglomeration, because it says nothing 
about the prospect of overinvestment in R&D. 
 
B. Collaboration and R&D Efficiency 
¶15. The designers of the initiatives of the 1980’s endeavored to 
“emulate ‘Japanese style’ collaboration,” by which competing entities 
would engage in “government-sponsored cooperative R&D.”46  The 
designers of the NCRA, for example, understood that allowing 
competing firms to collaborate would allow them to share costs and thus 
avoid “wasteful duplication of research and development efforts.”47
                                                                                                                       
Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Policy and Innovation: Must 
Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?, 5 INNOVATION 
POL’Y & ECON. 109, 131 (2005).  
  
Observers and industry insiders said much the same about the 
44 See, e.g., id. at 136; Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size 
and R&D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 926 (1996). 
45 Cohan and Klepper observe that “policy-makers continue to harbour beliefs 
about the advantages of large firm size in R & D competition despite the 
apparent absence of empirical evidence that would support these beliefs.” 
Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R&D, 106 ECON. J. 
925, 925 (1996).  They go on to suggest, however, that there can be some 
advantages that obtain to large firms in conducting R&D.  Even so, Katz and 
Shelanski summarize the state of understanding as follows:  
The evidence overall thus suggests that, to the extent firm size has an effect on 
innovation, its magnitude and direction depend on associated industry-level 
variables and are susceptible to few general presumptions.  The results suggest 
that especially large firms like those created by some recent mergers will have 
no special tendency—nor any predictable reluctance—to engage in innovation, 
and that small, fringe firms may play important roles over time in 
technologically advancing markets.  
Katz & Shelanski, supra note 43, at 136. 
46 Sakakibara, Heterogeneity, supra note 19, at 117. 
47 S. REP. No. 98-427, pt. 1, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 
3106. 
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government-sponsored SEMATECH consortium.48
 
  But many, many 
funny things happened on the way to the consortium.  I will enumerate 
six. 
1. For the most part, Japanese consortia themselves have not emulated the    
   Japanese style of collaboration. 
 
¶16. Sakakibara observes that the perception of a Japanese style of 
collaborative R&D, as well as perception of the success the Japanese 
style had, derived largely from case studies and anecdotal evidence.49  In 
contrast, analyses of comprehensive data on Japanese consortia suggest 
that Japanese consortia have often featured more vertical structures by 




2. Japanese consortia were more often organized as “vertical” structures       
   rather than “horizontal” structures that would join competing entities.     
 
¶17. Japanese consortia have comprised “vertical” structures by 
which participating entities would contribute complementary know-how 




3. Cost-sharing has been an important feature of much collaborative R&D,    
    but such collaborations often concentrate research efforts on a single 
   entity rather than distributing them across several entities. 
 
                                                     
48 See, for example, the comments of Intel co-founder and Sematech president 
Robert Noyce.  Robert Noyce, Cooperation Is The Best Way to Beat Japan, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at F2; Kenneth S. Flamm, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1987, at A30. 
49 Sakakibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia, supra note 20, at 182. 
50 See Lee Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, When Do Research Consortia 
Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
143, 145 (2002) (“Secondly, the government generally sought (not always 
successfully) to encourage complete dissemination of all research results to the 
participating firms.  Furthermore, in selecting participants for consortia formed 
since the early 1980s, the government generally sought to bring together firms 
with complementary research assets.”); Branstetter & Sakakibara, 
Microeconometric Analysis, supra note 19, at 214 (“While R&D managers listed 
a number of motivations for seeking to participate in consortia, the most highly 
cited reason for seeking to participate in consortia was access to complementary 
knowledge assets of other participants.”). See generally Sakakibara, 
Heterogenity, supra note 19. 
51 Sakikibara, The Diversity of R&D Consortia, supra note 20, at 184–85.   
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¶18. Many Japanese consortia may have featured “vertical” 
structures, but cost-sharing has been the dominant feature of some 
consortia, including non-Japanese consortia.  Roller, Siebert and 
Tombak, and Majewski and Williamson, observe, for example, that cost-
sharing has been an important feature of many consortia that have 
secured the protection afforded by the NCRA.52  Majewski and 
Williamson further note that such cost-sharing consortia have generally 
concentrated R&D efforts on a single entity.53  That entity might be a 
consortium member itself, or it might be an outside entity such as a 
university or specialized research house.54
 
 
4. Formal economic theory illuminated a “free-riding” problem that could 
   frustrate collaborative R&D. 
 
¶19. At the same time policymakers were debating the initiatives of 
the early 1980’s, researchers started to take up cost-sharing as an 
important motivation for forming research consortia.55
                                                     
52 Lars-Hendrik Roller et al., Why Firms Form (or do not Form) RJVs, 117 
ECON. J. 1122, 1142 (2007); Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, 
supra note 19.  One may note an outstanding question about self-selection and 
the representativeness of the NCRA data: Have consortia featuring cost-sharing 
been more likely, less likely, or as likely as other consortia to make NCRA 
filings? 
  They examined 
cost-sharing in environments in which collaboration might induce know-
how to spillover between consortium members.  Policymakers would 
perceive knowledge spillovers as a positive aspect of collaboration, but 
consortium participants might endeavor to frustrate spillovers.  
Specifically, they might endeavor to contain spillovers from themselves 
to other consortium members, especially if these other members were 
direct competitors.  At the same time, consortium participants might try 
to absorb know-how from those other members without making 
significant contributions of their own.  That is, individual members might 
“free-ride” on the efforts and contributions of others.  Collectively, 
53 Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19 at 218. 
54 Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19.  The authors 
identify the cost-sharing phenomenon with consortia they identify as “Contract 
R&D” – that is, with consortia that contract the services of an outside party such 
as a university lab or research house.  Id.  They also identify cost-sharing with 
“Coordinator-led R&D”.  Id.   Such consortia are distinguished by an entity that 
publicly posts the terms of participation and maintains open membership.  Id.  
That entity might conduct the R&D itself or secure the services of a consortium 
member or outside party.  Id. 
55 Again, seminal contributions include: Spence, supra note 20; Katz, supra note 
20; d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, supra note 20, and Morton I. Kamien et al., 
supra note 20.  
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consortium members might end up contributing less vigorously to 
collaborative R&D than they would had they not individually perceived 
the free-rider problem. 
 
5. The first incarnation of SEMATECH experienced free-rider problems. 
 
¶20. Grindley, Mowery and Silverman observe that SEMATECH 
participants perceived the free-rider problem and ended up participating 
less vigorously in the consortium.56
 
  Several years into the program, 
SEMATECH adapted by taking on a more vertical structure that would 
encourage participants to share complementary know-how. 
6. Japanese policymakers have come to model some of their own innovation 
   policies after American policies. 
 
¶21. Flamm and Nagaoka observe that  
[i]t is widely believed in Japan that the strong basic research capability 
of U.S. universities supported by a high level of federal support, close 
collaboration between industry and universities, and strong protection 
of intellectual property rights have been major contributing factors to 
the impressive recovery of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s . . . 
.  Close partnerships between universities and industry have enabled 
basic scientific capabilities to be transformed into emergent new 
industries in areas such as biotechnology and information 
technology.57
They further observe that, since the mid-1990’s, the Japanese have 
adopted policies to promote industry-university partnerships.
   
58
¶22. Taken all together, it is not surprising that the antitrust 
authorities in the United States have rarely challenged R&D consortia.
 
59  
Policymakers assembled programs like the NCRA to address concerns 
that private antitrust actions or government enforcement could frustrate 
procompetitive collaboration between competitors.60  Policymakers 
identified “Japanese style” collaboration with the kind of collaboration 
they had hoped to promote.61
                                                     
56 Grindley et al., supra note 19. 
  Yet, with the exception of a few highly 
publicized, government-sponsored consortia such as SEMATECH, there 
is little evidence that consortia in the United States or even Japan have 
tended to organize themselves around the purportedly “Japanese style.”  
57 Flamm & Nagaoka, supra note 16, at 73. 
58 Id. 
59 S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105; Turner, supra note 
17; Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy, supra note 17. 
60 Senate Report, S. REP. NO. 98-427, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105. 
61 Id. at 3106. 
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The federal government has subsidized many consortia through its 
various programs at the Department of Defense and through the 
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) maintained at the Commerce 
Department.62  Even so, data available through the NCRA program 
suggest that government-subsidized consortia as well as other consortia 
tend either to concentrate R&D on a single entity or to aggregate 
complementary know-how, capabilities, and efforts from a range of 
entities.63  Similarly, evidence from the ATP program suggests that ATP-
subsidized consortia tend not to feature entities that are direct market 
rivals.64
¶23. Complementarity alone would not relieve any one venture of 
antitrust scrutiny, but it does provide some basis for the claim that 
antitrust has given “wide latitude to joint research and development 
[even] among competitors.”
 
65  A question remains about whether data 
from the ATP and NCRA are representative of all consortia.  It might be 
the case that many consortia comprise entities that the antitrust 
authorities would recognize as “actual or potential competitors” in some 
market.  The prospect of actual or potential competition invites scrutiny, 
and theory has illuminated the possibility that actual or potential 
competitors might be able to exploit collaboration in R&D to soften 
competition.66
 
  Even so, the same theory recognizes a role for avoiding 
the duplication of costly R&D, an effect that the antitrust authorities 
would count as procompetitive.   
 
C. Dynamic Competition 
¶24. Antitrust might be occupied with understanding interactions 
between “actual or potential competitors” in existing markets.  But what 
of potential competition in markets that have yet to emerge?  Also, 
consider the situation of two parties who might not presently compete in 
an antitrust-cognizable market.  Knowledge spillovers and R&D effort 
might enable one to become the rival of another in an existing market.  
Can the antitrust authorities accommodate the realization of such 
potential competition?  Also, should antitrust formally recognize the 
R&D process itself as a dimension along which firms compete? 
                                                     
62 Since 1990, the Commerce Department has subsidized individual firms and 
consortia through the ATP. 
63 Majewski & Williamson, Incomplete Contracting, supra note 19, at 216–18. 
64 Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Measuring The Impact of U.S. 
Research Consortia, 24 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 51, 65 (2003). 
65 Turner, supra note 17, at 486.  
66 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 20, at 529. 
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¶25. These questions relate to a larger question about “dynamic 
competition.”  Parties might make investments now—in R&D, in 
production capacity, in brand equity, and so on—that will enable them to 
later commercialize goods and services in existing markets or new 
markets.  None of that is specific to R&D, but investment in R&D is 
interesting because it might tend to be more “disruptive” than other types 
of investment.  R&D might, for example, yield innovations that render 
rivals’ production capacity obsolete, thus leading to dramatic shifts in 
market shares. 
¶26. Jorde and Teece suggested that the antitrust authorities should 
recognize innovation as an important dimension of dynamic competition 
and should, therefore, be more circumspect about applying traditional 
antitrust analysis that depends on static snap-shots of market 
conditions.67  The interpretation of Gilbert and Sunshine was more 
ambitious.  They contemplated actual and potential competition in the 
R&D process itself,68 and their ideas found expression in the Intellectual 
Property Guidelines in the language of “innovation markets.”69
¶27. From the beginning, the concept of innovation markets had 
critics,
  The 
concept of innovation markets constituted a way of explicitly 
recognizing investment in R&D as a dimension of competition.  Of 
course, one can imagine extending analysis of actual and potential 
competition to investment in general rather than limiting it to investment 
in R&D, but the point is that the concept of innovation markets 
constituted an attempt to formalize antitrust analysis of dynamic 
competition. 
70 and operationalizing it has sometimes proven difficult.71
                                                     
67 Jorde & Teece, supra note 18, at 86–89. The authors’ concerns also extended 
to private parties.  Jorde and Teece observed that parties might participate in 
collaborative R&D in order to situate themselves to compete in emerging or 
existing markets.  Collaboration might, for example, allow them to tap into the 
complementary know-how and capabilities of other parties.  Id. at 78.  Jorde and 
Teece suggested, however, that rivals excluded from collaboration might be 
tempted to characterize collaborative agreements as anticompetitive and might 
thus be able to frustrate collaboration with costly antitrust litigation.  Id.   
  Some 
68 Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 38, at 571.  
69 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 
3.2.3 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. 
70 See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?, 
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 55 (1995) (suggesting that the concept of “innovation 
markets” would provide a new means of attacking “conglomerate” mergers); 
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to 
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 20 (1995) (noting that the concept 
constitutes little more than another way to frame “potential competition” and to 
invite the enforcement hazards that attend “potential competition”). 
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observers further note that the question of how to formally operationalize 
antitrust analysis of competition in R&D remains open.72  Even so, some 
observers suggest that certain R&D-intensive industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, are more amenable to the concept of innovation 
markets. 73  Ironically, these industries may be more amenable to the 
concept, because they are static in certain ways.  Specifically, these 
industries might be R&D-intensive, but, like pharmaceuticals, they might 
be less susceptible to “disruptive” changes in market structure.  
Industries that depend on designing molecules—pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, certain lines of agri-business, and so on—fit the pattern.  
Further, it may be no accident that those same industries are ones in 
which patents have constituted the principal means of appropriating 
returns to R&D.74
¶28. I put aside questions about how to formally incorporate R&D 
into antitrust analysis and observe that static analysis can capture certain 
strategic aspects of competition involving intellectual property.
 
75
¶29. Merely identifying vertical relationships imparts structure to 
antitrust analysis in at least two ways.  First, it allows investigators to 
avoid certain types of inappropriate enforcement actions.   Two firms 
might have the appearance of competing in a market for some good or 
service, yet one of those firms might maintain a bottleneck over one of 
the inputs.  That firm might, for example, own a bundle of patents to 
  
Specifically, when examining a merger or contractual relationship, 
invoking “intellectual property” amounts to claiming that at least two 
parties are contributing complementary inputs to the commercialization 
of some good or service.   That, in turn, amounts to illuminating 
important “vertical” relationships: the owner of some intellectual 
property may grant to other parties’ rights-of-way to commercialize a 
good or service, and those other parties contribute inputs to the actual 
commercialization.   
                                                                                                                       
71 See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust 
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 43, 83 (2001) (noting innovation market analysis in antitrust cases has been 
unnecessary to reach the outcomes).   
72 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-
Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
393, 415 (2008) (suggesting a new test for analyzing innovation markets in 
antitrust cases).   
73 Id. 
74 See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the 
Chemical Industry, 26 RES. POL’Y 391, 401 (1997); Cohen et al., supra note 26, 
at 2; JOSEPH BORKIN & CHARLES A. WELSH, GERMANY’S MASTER PLAN (1943).  
75 The brief discussion here parallels the more extensive discussion in Part 3 of 
the Intellectual Property Guidelines on “Technology Markets” and “Horizontal 
and Vertical Relationships.” 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 1 
which any other firm would have to secure a license.  Granting a license 
may thus give the appearance of competition in the goods market.  A 
merger of the two firms would, in turn, give the appearance of a 
reduction of competition in the goods market, but that competition is 
something of a fiction to begin with because it depends on the patent 
holder exercising its option to grant rights-of-way to other parties.76
¶30. Second, identifying important vertical relationships allows 
investigators to identify certain concerns that would otherwise be missed.  
Consider, for example, an environment in which two firms maintain 
distinct patent positions that situate them to separately grant rights-of-
way to commercialize goods in a particular goods market.  Suppose, 
further, that no other party is situated to grant rights-of-way.  A merger 
of the two patent-holding firms would allow the merged entity to secure 
a bottleneck where no bottleneck had existed before.  (It is not obvious 
that such a situation often arises, but I will present an example below.)  
The merging parties might not even produce goods themselves, in which 
case, the merger would give the appearance of no concentration in the 
goods market, but that would mask the reality of merger to monopoly in 
the technologies to which parties must secure license to produce goods at 
all.  The merged entity would then be in a position to impose licensing 
terms that would allow it to secure monopolistic returns. 
  
Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to conduct analysis of such a 
merger without accounting for the vertical relationship between licensor 
and licensee. 
 
II. ANTITRUST AND UNCERTAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
¶31. The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property 
circumscribes two century-long debates.  The first pertains to the 
question of how antitrust law and intellectual property law interact.  
Observers will know, however, that decisions like CSU77 and Trinko,78
                                                     
76 What if the patent holder exercised its option to deny rights-of-way?  Failing 
to grant a license or withdrawing a license gets into controversial antitrust 
questions about “refusals to deal.”  For further explanation, see infra Part II.   
 in 
2000 and 2004 respectively, precipitated another cycle of vigorous 
debate within antitrust about how parties can exploit property rights, 
including intellectual property rights, to exclude rivals.  Indeed, if one 
views intellectual property through an antitrust lens, then one stumbles 
into the hundred-years debate about “refusals to deal,” “exclusionary 
77 CSU v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (3d Cir. 2000).  
78 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004). 
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conduct,” and “monopolization.”79  It becomes natural, for example, to 
consider how a patent holder might condition patent licenses or 
selectively refuse licenses to frustrate or “exclude” rivals.  But, as 
Hovenkamp observes, “Notwithstanding a century of litigation, the scope 
and meaning of exclusionary conduct under the Sherman Act remain 
poorly defined.  No generalized formulation of unilateral or multilateral 
exclusionary conduct enjoys anything approaching universal 
acceptance.”80
¶32. A problem with intellectual property rights is that they may also 
be poorly defined.  At first sight, there is nothing distinctive about 
intellectual property rights, in that, like any property rights, they invite 
process—formal process to which parties may appeal to sort out property 
rights violations.  A difficulty is that “the boundaries of intellectual 
property rights are often uncertain and difficult to define, so that neither 
the intellectual property holder nor competitors know the precise extent 
of protection afforded by the intellectual property right without a 
decision from a court or binding arbiter.”
  
81
¶33. The problem of delineating property rights imposes some 
practical difficulties on antitrust enforcement.  I outline just one: 
uncertain property rights can impose constraints on the design of 
remedies to merger transactions.  A candidate remedy to a problematic 
  That is not the end of it.  
That court or binding arbiter will be no better situated than litigants 
themselves to delineate intellectual properties, and yet process may 
impose on a court or an arbiter the obligation to impose a decision.  Nor 
would enforcement authorities be better situated, and yet, antitrust 
enforcement may also impose an obligation on the authorities to 
distinguish fine lines between intellectual properties. 
                                                     
79 See, e.g., Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad 
between Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and 
European Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER INFO. L. 455 
(2007); Carrier, Refusals to License, supra note 22; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act]; Douglas A. Melamed, 
Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and 
Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005); Eleanor M. Fox, Is 
There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005); Gifford, supra note 15; Melamed  
& Stoeppelwerth, supra note 17; Pate, supra note 15; Pitofsky, Beyond 
Microsoft, supra note 21. 
80  Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, supra note 79, at 147–48 
(citation omitted). 
81 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N., ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm.  
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merger transaction may, for example, take the form of a divestiture by 
which the merging parties spin off a bundle of assets to a third party.  
When property rights are uncertain, it may not be obvious what rights-to-
exclude attend any one divested asset.  At the same time, however, it 
may yet be understood that a certain bundle of assets comprises rights-to-
exclude that are extensive enough such that the bundle would constitute a 
bottleneck if secured under unified control.82  Consider, then, a merger 
transaction that would allow the merged entity to secure the bottleneck. 
One candidate remedy might feature the spin-off of some subset of assets 
in that bundle.  One might, for example, look for a divestiture package 
that (1) breaks the bottleneck by yielding to third party rights-of-way to 
commercialize a good or service while (2) simultaneously preserving the 
rights-of-way of the merged entity.  Securing such a result amounts to 
saying that the bottleneck actually encompassed two bundles of assets, 
each of which separately affords rights-of-way.83
                                                     
82 The fact pattern might seem contrived, but consider the patent thicket 
phenomenon articulated by Gilbert and Newbery, and Carl Shapiro. Richard J. 
Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 514 (1982); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119 (2001).  In some environments, an 
individual patent might not vest the patent holder with the capacity to block 
others from commercializing a technology.  In contrast, control of a portfolio of 
individually weak patents might constitute a bottleneck.  
  Such a divestiture 
package might exist, but consider the alternative.  Given the uncertainty 
of property rights, it may not be obvious that a divestiture package yields 
rights-of-way to any one party without denying rights-of-way to another.  
In such a case, one might relieve concerns about the merger transaction 
by crafting a remedy that yields access to the bottleneck to third parties 
by long-term contract.  A contract is less severe than an outright 
83 The experiences of Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Kimberly-Clark (KC) in the 
“Diaper Wars” are illustrative.  On October 11, 1985, P&G and KC separately 
filed applications for patents pertaining disposable diapers with elasticized legs.   
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. 973 F.2d 911, 912–13 
(1992).  In 1989 KC sued P&G for infringement, and the parties pursued the 
matter all the way to a judgment, thus forcing the judge to sift through decades 
of patent claims and delineate the boundaries between the two parties’ portfolios 
of claims.  Id.  The judgment amounted to partitioning the claims into two 
channels for commercializing two variants of diapers with elasticized legs.  Id.  
The judgment also assigned one channel to KC and the other to P&G.  Id.  
Licensees seeking to commercialize either variant thus ended up having to 
secure a license from either KC or P&G.  Id.  Both P&D and KC subsequently 
pursued separate and successful patent infringement litigation against other 
parties. 
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divestiture and has the advantage of preserving the access to the 
bottleneck of more than one competing entity. 
¶34. In the context of patents, the long-term contract would amount to 
a licensing agreement.  But at least one more complication remains: to 
determine what patents to include in a license.  Antitrust authorities often 
find themselves having to choose patents from a portfolio of patents, a 
situation where hazards are abound.  A divestiture package may 
enumerate some number of patents, but that leaves open the prospect 
that, post-merger, the merged entity pulls some other bundle of patents 
out of its hat—patents that may yet support infringement claims against 
licensors.  The capacity to assert infringement matters, because it may 
allow the merged entity to frustrate the ability of licensors to compete, 
thus, defeating the purpose of the licensing remedy.84  There are, of 
course, alternatives to enumerating patents. The principal alternative is to 
do what firms do when facing the same hazards: finesse the enumeration 
of patents and the hazards that enumeration invites by granting rights-of-





A. Example of a field-of-use licensing remedy: The acquisition of 
DTM by 3D Systems 
 
¶35. In 2001, the Department of Justice challenged the proposed 
acquisition of DTM Corporation (DTM) by 3D Systems Corporation 
(3D).86  Both 3D and DTM developed and manufactured “rapid 
prototyping” (RP) equipment, and both firms maintained extensive 
patent portfolios relating to two different RP technologies.87
                                                     
84 See Jean O. Lanjouw  & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent 
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 147 (2001) 
(examining the types of patents most frequently litigated).  See generally Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001) (arguing that preliminary injunctions are misused in 
patent litigation to limit competition). 
  3D’s patent 
position allowed it to secure rights-of-way in the United States to 
commercialize an RP technology known as “stereolithography,” and 3D 
85 See, e.g., Grindley & Teece, supra note 26, at 9 (discussing fields-of-use in 
the licensing of intellectual property relating to electronics and semiconductors). 
86 United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. 1:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL 964343 
(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001). 
87 See Competitive Impact Statement at 1, United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., Civ. 
No. 1:01CV01237(GK) (D.D.C. September 4, 2001), available at 
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had successfully used its position to deny rights-of-way to other parties 
to commercialize stereolithographic systems in the United States.88  
Similarly, DTM’s patent position allowed it to secure rights-of-way to 
commercialize an RP technology known as “laser sintering,” and it had 
managed to frustrate the efforts of other parties to commercialize laser 
sintering systems in the United States.89  Other firms commercialized 
different RP technologies in the United States, but importantly, the 
government distinguished high-end “industrial rapid prototyping 
systems” from lower-end systems.90  The Department’s complaint 
alleged that the proposed acquisition would “substantially lessen 
competition in the development, production and sale of industrial RP 
systems sold in the United States . . . .”91
¶36. The parties subsequently reached a settlement with the 
government by which the merged entity would yield rights-of-way to a 
third party to commercialize an industrial RP system in the United 
States.
 
92  The third party would secure rights-of-way by means of a 
license from 3D Systems to commercialize RP systems in either of two 
fields-of-use indicated as “SL Technology” (stereolithography) and “LS 
Technology” (laser sintering).93  Further, the government restricted 
candidate licensors to firms that had already commercialized industrial 
RP systems in stereolithography or laser sintering.94  Among the 
candidates were firms that had commercialized stereolithography and 
laser sintering systems in Europe and Asia.95
¶37. The formulation of the license in terms of a field-of-use relieved 
the government of having to indicate specific patents that might 
otherwise have been included in a more traditional patent license.  
Affirmatively specifying patents in a license would have opened up the 
prospect that, post-acquisition, 3D could exploit patents excluded from 
the license to assert infringement against the licensor.  Drawing the 
licensee into patent infringement litigation could frustrate the licensee’s 




¶38. Antitrust enforcement and innovation policy may make for an 
odd, strangely compatible couple, if not the odd couple, in that the one 
                                                     
88 Id. at 7.  
89 Id. at 4–5.  
90 Id. at 1–2. 
91 Id. at 6. 
92 Id. at 2. 
93 Id. at 4. 
94 Id. at 1–2. 
95 Id. at 5. 
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(innovation policy) has been worried about interference from the other 
(antitrust) while the other has been blithely getting on with its business.  
Policymakers have, for example, long appreciated that collaboration, 
including collaboration between competitors, could promote innovation.  
Never mind that collaborative R&D remains poorly understood.  The 
expectation had been that collaboration would promote the efficiency of 
R&D by allowing parties to avoid duplicative R&D and to join 
complementary know-how and capabilities.  Yet policymakers worried 
that the prospect of antitrust scrutiny could frustrate that same 
collaboration.  The antitrust authorities, of course, are interested in the 
consequences of collaboration for competition, but even before 
enactment of the wave of innovation-minded initiatives in the 1980’s and 
1990’s, there was little evidence that antitrust was getting in the way of 
collaborative R&D.  Since then, researchers have gathered some 
evidence which suggests that most of the action in collaborative R&D 
has involved collaboration between parties who are not direct 
competitors in existing goods markets.  Perhaps it is not surprising, then, 
that parties who are not actual competitors tend to contribute 
complementary inputs to collaborative R&D.  There is even evidence 
that parties factor the potential for future competition into their decisions 
to join (or not join) collaborative R&D efforts.  In all of this, there are no 
obvious justifications for the antitrust authorities to mount challenges 
against collaborative R&D. 
¶39. What does innovation imply for antitrust enforcement?  
Investment in R&D—the stuff that yields innovation—depends 
importantly on the efforts of parties to police their intellectual properties.  
Shifting the focus from “intellectual property rights” to “uncertain 
property rights” makes it easier to understand what innovation and 
intellectual property really imply.  They imply the same enforcement 
processes, but they do complicate those processes.  The antitrust 
authorities may find themselves facing the prospect of delineating 
intellectual properties.  Yet unlike judges in a patent infringement case, 
the antitrust authorities may have alternatives.  Like private parties, they 
may be able to finesse the problem by appealing to concepts such as 
fields-of-use rather than delineating intellectual properties.  Also, many 
observers will know that uncertain property rights do not preclude the 
possibility of identifying bundles of assets that would constitute 
bottlenecks if concentrated under unified control.  That may allow the 
authorities to conduct their analyses without extra complication. 
 
